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ARGUMENT 
I. STATEMENT RELATING TO FACTUAL ISSUES. 
Most of the facts in the present case are not in dispute. 
One fact which is in dispute is the factual finding that the 
removal of the office complexes would not damage the property. 
The photographic exhibits presented at the trial clearly show that 
the removal of an adjacent modular office complex left large holes 
in the asphalt, conduit and utility stub-outs protruding from the 
ground, etc. Plaintiff believes that the trial court's finding 
that the removal of the complexes will not damage the property is 
against the clear weight of photographic evidence, the only 
competent evidence on that issue. Further, Plaintiff disputes the 
statement of facts proffered by Hercules in that the interior 
walls were not demountable partitions as stated in Paragraph 8 of 
the Statement of the Facts contained in Hercules brief but were to 
be traditionally finished drywall with vinyl wall coverings. The 
document at Record 170, Exhibit 4, does not specify demountable 
partitions as Hercules would lead this Court to believe. The 
testimony at the trial was that while demountable partitions were 
common in the Modulaire office units, the Hercules units were of 
traditional interior wall finish. 
Hercules, at Paragraph 21 of its Statement of the Facts, also 
erroneously states that the units were not fixed to the ground. 
This is simply not true since the testimony at trial indicates 
that the office complexes were attached to underground utilities 
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and services. The fact that there were not concrete foundations 
or piers does not preclude fixation to the ground. 
Whether the workers who installed the underground utilities 
and the asphalt and concrete pavement would be entitled to 
mechanic's lien and payment bond rights is important since there 
are instances where services which of themselves would not 
normally give rise to mechanic's lien or bond rights do give rise 
to such rights when performed in conjunction with a construction 
project. See Bachus v. Hooten, 4 Utah 2d 364, 294 P.2d 703 (1956) 
and Frehner v. Morton, 18 Utah 2d 422, 424 P.2d 446 (1967). If 
the actual construction of the office complexes alone does not 
give rise to mechanic's lien and bond rights, then when performed 
in connection with the installation of the utilities, asphalt, 
etc. should give rise to such rights. 
II. PLAINTIFF AND HERCULES ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT AS TO THE LAW 
WHICH SHOULD GOVERN IN THIS CASE; THE PERSONAL PROPERTY/ 
FIXTURE TEST AS STATED IN PAUL MUELLER CO. V. CACHE VALLEY 
DAIRY ASS'N. , 657 P. 2d 1279 (Utah 1982) SHOULD NOT APPLY TO 
THE CASE AT BAR. 
In its brief, Hercules erroneously states that both parties 
to this appeal are in agreement as to the law to be applied to the 
case at bar. That assertion is not true. Plaintiff does not 
believe that the personal property/fixture test as stated in the 
case of Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n., 657 P. 2d 
1279 (Utah 1982) is applicable to this case. As discussed in 
Plaintiff's brief, while Plaintiff believes that the office 
complexes in question meet the Mueller test, it is abundantly 
clear that the situation in the case at bar is far different from 
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that in the Mueller case and that the Mueller test should not 
apply. 
The personal property/fixture distinction as discussed in 
Mueller deals with items which are attached to a building (i.e., 
equipment) rather than to the actual building itself as is the 
situation in the present case. Certainly the same test cannot 
apply to equipment and to actual buildings containing more than 
25,000 square feet of office space. To carry Hercules1 logic to 
the full extension, one would have to conclude that the metal 
building to which the equipment was attached in the Mueller case 
does not give rise to a mechanic's lien or to payment bond liabil-
ity since such metal buildings are removable without too much 
difficulty. However, the manwalks in the Mueller case were 
lienable, and, therefore, presumably the building would be a 
lienable item. 
For this appeal, the operative language of the mechanic's 
lien statute is "the construction, alteration , or improvement of 
any building, structure or improvement to the premises in any 
manner." Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-3 (1953). The operative 
language of the payment bond statute is "the construction, 
addition to, alteration, or repair of any building, structure or 
improvement." Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 (1953 as amended in 
1985). These phrases state the type of work which is covered by 
the statutes and object of such. First, there must be construc-
tion, addition to, alteration, or repair work. This work must 
relate to (1) a "building," (2) a "structure," or (3) an 
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"improvement," Historically, when there was never any question 
about buildings or a structures being covered by these statutes, 
even though they could be moved from the land. See Sanford v. 
Kunkel, 30 Utah 379, 85 P. 363 (1906). It was in connection with 
"improvements" that the issue of personal property v. fixtures 
became critical. 
There is no reason to depart from that distinction now. 
Clearly these office complexes comprise buildings or structures or 
that they were constructed and placed upon the subject property. 
Blacks Law Dictionary defines "building" as a 
S t r u c t u r e d e s i g n e d f o r h a b i t a t i o n , 
s h e l t e r , s t o r a g e , t r a d e , m a n u f a c t u r e , 
r e l i g i o n , business , education, and the l i k e . 
A s t r u c t u r e or e d i f i c e i n c l o s i n g a space 
w i t h i n w a l l s , and u s u a l l y , b u t n o t 
necessa r i ly , covered with a roof. 
Black's Law Dictionary 1979, p. 176. 
Blacks Law Dictionary defines "structure" as 
Any construction, or any production or 
piece of work artificially built up or 
composed of parts joined together in some 
definite manner. That which is built or 
constructed; an edifice or building of any 
kind. 
A combination of materials to form a 
construction for occupancy, use or 
ornamentation whether installed on, above, or 
below the surface of a parcel of land. 
Black's Law Dictionary 1979, p. 1276. 
It is important to note that there is no requirement for 
affixation or attachment to the land upon which it is placed. In 
fact the definition of structure specifically allows for 
installation above the land. 
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Such a result has been indicated previously by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of King Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln 
Company, 21 Utah 2d 43, 440 P.2d 17 (1968). The Court stated: 
The duty of obtaining a bond as imposed by 
Section 14-2-1 is upon: "The owner of any 
interest in land" who enters into a contract 
to construct an improvement thereon. The word 
"land" as used in the law, has since time 
immemorial been regarded as a generic term. 
It "* * * includes not only the soil, but 
everything attached to it, whether by nature, 
as trees, herbage, and water, or by the hand 
of man, as buildings, fixtures, and fences." 
This is particularly true with respect to 
these lien statutes which should be liberally 
construed to effectuate their purposes. This 
court has allowed a materialman's lien to 
attach to interests less than fee simple, such 
as a leasehold estate, an equitable interest, 
and a building separate and apart from the 
soil upon which it was erected, (citations 
omitted) (emphasis in original) 
King Brothers at 440 P.2d 19. 
It is clear that the Utah Supreme Court views "buildings" as 
separate and distinct from "fixtures." A building does not have 
to be attached to the soil in the same manner as a fixture must be 
attached in order to give rights to mechanic's lien and bond 
rights. It is sufficient that the "building" or "structure" be 
placed upon the land. 
Hercules would have this Court treat the office complexes as 
traditional personal property/fixtures. This ignores the fact 
that the office complexes are buildings or structures to which the 
traditional personal property/fixture tests do not apply. 
Buildings or structures of the magnitude in this case should 
be deemed to be part of the realty upon which they are placed 
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regardless of the manner in which they are placed upon the land. 
This is particularly true given the ability of man to move even 
traditionally constructed buildings with relative ease and the 
advance of technology in the area of premanufactured buildings 
which are transported to the site and placed upon the land. The 
case of Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 Utah 379, 85 P. 363 (1906) provides 
an example of such a situation. In that case, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that where a building is moved from one parcel of land 
to another after improvements to the building were made, that a 
mechanic's lien could attach to both parcels of land. 
The fact that the office complexes in the present case can be 
torn apart and moved as individual units should not alter the 
outcome as stated in Sanford. As far as Plaintiff's claim is 
concerned, the work required to construct the office complexes was 
the same as for any traditionally constructed building. There was 
nothing to alert the Plaintiff that this construction project 
would not afford mechanic's lien or payment bond protection as 
with any other construction project. 
Hercules places a great deal of emphasis on the third part of 
the Mueller test, (i.e., intent of the owner). However, that 
element is clearly inappropriate in this case which involves 
buildings of considerable size which were procured through a 
lease/purchase arrangement between Hercules and its contractor, 
Modulaire, when lease/purchase arrangements are routinely used in 
commercial transactions as a financing instruments. This is 
particularly true when at the time of trial, the lease period had 
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been twice extended and to Plaintiff's knowledge, the office 
complexes remain on the subject property in which Hercules has an 
interest. 
Further, any agreement between Hercules and its contractor as 
to the status of the office complexes should not be binding on the 
Plaintiff herein who was a complete stranger to that transaction, 
being thrice removed in the contract chain from the Hercules/U.S. 
Government contract and twice removed from the Hercules/Modulaire 
contract. This principal is illustrated in the case of Saunders 
v, Kidman, 284 P. 997 (Utah 1930). In Saunders, a purchaser of 
real property succeeded in establishing that a cabin on the 
property was part of the realty despite a separate agreement 
between the seller and a third-party that the cabin could be 
removed. The trial court found, and the Utah Supreme Court held, 
that as between the seller and the third-party the cabin was 
personal property but as between the seller and the purchaser the 
cabin was part of the realty. 
Similarly, in the case at bar, it could be appropriate to 
treat the office complexes as personal property as between 
Hercules and the U.S. Government or as between Hercules and 
Modulaire. But as between Hercules and Plaintiff, the office 
complexes should be deemed to be part of the realty. Such a 
holding makes good common sense. 
Such a holding not only make good common sense, it is in 
accord with other Utah case law. In Metals Manufacturing Co. v. 
Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74, 395 P.2d 914 (1964), the Utah 
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Supreme Court confronted a situation similar to the one presented 
in the present case. In Metals Manufacturing,, the Bank of 
Commerce held a 10-year lease which provided that the Bank could 
"make alterations, attach fixtures, and erect additions * * *" 
which would remain the property of the bank and be removed upon 
the expiration of the lease. A second-tier supplier and installer 
of metal hand rails and grates made a claim for failure to obtain 
a bond and the Bank defended on the basis that the goods did not 
become fixtures due to the provisions in the lease specifying that 
they remain the personal property of the Bank. The trial court 
ruled in favor of the Bank and dismissed the supplier's cause of 
action. In reversing the trial court, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that: 
[I]t would seem unrealistic and unreasonable 
to conclude that [the bank and its contractor] 
by agreeing among themselves, could bind third 
party suppliers of materials to the terms of 
an agreement to which such suppliers were not 
privies and the terms of which they did not 
know. Such conclusion could result in the 
easy circumvention of the statute whose 
purpose clearly is to protect suppliers, if 
what they supply falls within the clear import 
of the statute, (emphasis in original) 
Id. at 395 P.2d 914, 915. 
The Utah Supreme Court had another occasion to discuss this 
principal. The Court summarized its holding in Metals 
Manufacturing as follows: 
We held that irrespective of the agreement of 
the parties inter se, as to third-party 
suppliers, the installation should be regarded 
as part of the realty. It was pointed out 
that it would be unfair to bind such suppliers 
to the terms of agreements to which they were 
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not parties and of whose contents they had no 
knowledge. 
King Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 21 Utah 2d 43, 440 
P.2d 17, 18 (1968). As in both the Metals Manufacturing and King 
Brothers cases, it would be unreasonable and unfair to hold 
Plaintiff herein to the terms of any agreements between Hercules 
and the U.S. Government or between Hercules and Modulaire. 
Plaintiff was in no position to determine the intent of 
Hercules with respect to these office complexes and this Court 
should not impose such a burden. This is particularly true since 
the materials furnished by Plaintiff were essentially no different 
than those furnished by Plaintiff to any traditionally constructed 
buildings. There was no indication whatsoever that this project 
would not afford the Plaintiff protection under the mechanicfs 
lien and payment bond statutes. 
Further, it cannot be fairly said that based upon the the use 
contract between Hercules and the U.S. Government the parties 
thereto intended that the office complexes be personal property. 
In fact, the use contract specifically includes a covenant by 
Hercules that it will keep the property free from liens and 
encumbrances. Certainly such a covenant contemplates that 
Hercules has an ownership interest sufficient to empower Hercules 
with the ability to create a lien on the property and contemplates 
that such liens are possible. See second sentence of Paragraph 8 
b of the General Provisions for Use Contract. Record at 275. 
Additionally, it cannot be fairly said that the agreement 
between Hercules and Modulaire contemplated that the office 
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complexes were to be personal property since on its fact the 
agreement is nothing more than a financing arrangement for the 
procurement of the office complexes, complete with renewal clauses 
and purchase options. See Record at 240. 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff seeks this Court to hold 
that the trial court erred in ruling that the office complexes 
were personal property which were not affixed to the subject real 
property. Based upon the full facts and circumstance presented to 
the trial court, the correct legal conclusion is that the office 
complexes do constitute "construction, addition to, alteration or 
repair of any building, structure or improvement." 
III. THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPAL FOR THE MECHANIC'S LIEN AND PAYMENT 
BOND STATUTES IS TO ASSURE THAT LABORERS AND MATERIALMEN GET 
PAID; WHERE AN IN PARI MATERIA READING OF THESE STATUTES AND 
CASES DECIDED THEREUNDER WOULD DEFEAT THIS CLEAR PURPOSE, THE 
STATUTES AND CASES DECIDED THEREUNDER SHOULD BE READ 
INDEPENDENTLY TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE UNDERLYING PURPOSE. 
The doctrine of in pari materia should not be used to defeat 
the purpose of the mechanic's lien and bond laws. The doctrine of 
in pari materia concerns those statutes which relate to the same 
person or thing or have a common purpose. Blacks Law Dictionary, 
1979, p. 711. Truly, as Hercules has pointed out, the Utah 
mechanic's lien and the Utah payment bond statutes have the same 
purpose (i.e., to assure that laborers and materialmen receive 
payment). However, Hercules would have this Court apply the 
doctrine of in pari materia to defeat the clear purpose of the 
mechanic's lien and bond statutes. 
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The purpose of the payment bond and mechanic's lien statutes 
is to assure that laborers and materialmen get paid. The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated: 
As we pointed out in Metals Manufacturing Co. 
v. Bank of Commerce, [16 Utah 2d 74, 395 P.2d 
914 (1964),] these statutes should be 
interpreted and applied in such a manner as to 
carry out the purpose for which they were 
created: to protect those who supply labor and 
materials. 
King Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 21 Utah 2d 43, 440 
P. 2d 17, 18 (1968). Hercules would have this Court ignore the 
clear and long held purpose of the mechanic's lien and payment 
bond statutes. 
Hercules would have this Court apply a personal property/ 
fixture test which was created in the context of the mechanic's 
lien statute to defeat Plaintiff's claim for Hercules failure to 
obtain a payment bond. This clearly would be inappropriate. 
In order to accomplish this stated purpose of assuring 
payment to laborers and materialmen, the Utah legislature has 
established certain mechanisms to assist laborers and materialmen 
to get paid. The first is the mechanic's lien which allows an 
encumbrance upon the property which was improved by the labor or 
materials to secure the payment of the debt. Usually, the 
mechanic's lien attaches only to the extent of the interest of the 
person who contracts for the improvement. 
The potential for mechanic's liens being filed against the 
property carries with it the possibility that an owner might have 
to pay twice for the services or materials received if the 
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mechanic's lien claimant is a lower tier subcontractor or 
supplier. The public policy established by the Utah legislature 
is that it is better for an owner to pay twice than to have 
laborers and suppliers go unpaid. However, an owner is not 
without a means to protect himself. One protection is that the 
owner may withhold money until all lien rights have lapsed. 
Additionally, an owner may protect himself by obtaining a payment 
bond from the parties with whom he contracts. In fact, the Utah 
legislature has obligated owners to obtain payment bonds to assure 
the payment of laborers and materialmen. See Utah Code Annotated 
§§ 14-2-1 et seq. (1953 as amended in 1985). Thus owners can 
protect themselves simply by complying with the statutory require-
ment to obtain a payment bond. If an owner fails to comply with 
the bonding requirement, he becomes personally liable to those who 
would have been covered by such payment bond. See Utah Code 
Annotated § 14-2-2 (1953 as amended in 1985). 
Such has been the law in Utah for many years, extending well 
before the current code. In establishing the constitutionality of 
the former code's version of the payment bond statute, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated this law and policy as follows: 
The bond, as in this case is conditioned upon 
the faithful performance of the contract and 
securing the payment of laborers and material-
men. If the owner requires the contractor to 
procure the statutory bond, he is protected 
against loss. If he does not, he becomes 
liable to laborers and materialmen if the 
contractor fails to pay them, even though he 
may have paid the contractor in full. He has 
his remedy in his own hands. 
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Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 P. 241, 246 
(1917). 
In the case at bar, Hercules could have chosen to protect 
itself by requiring a payment bond from its contractor, Modulaire. 
In the words of the Rio Grande Court, Hercules had its remedy in 
its own hands. However, it chose not to do so and now asks this 
Court to relieve it from its statutory obligation through a misuse 
of the doctrine of in pari materia. 
The risk of loss and the obligation to obtain the payment 
bond is with the owner and when the owner chooses to go contrary 
to the statutory requirement, he must be held to the obligations 
imposed by the statute. In such a situation, any close question 
ought to be resolved in favor of the unpaid laborer or supplier 
since the problem would not have arisen had the owner done what 
the statute says he ought to have done (i.e., obtained a payment 
bond). This is especially true when the purpose of the statute is 
to assure payment to laborers and materialmen. 
If for whatever reason, the mechanic's lien statute is 
incapable of achieving the purpose of ensuring payment to laborers 
and materialmen, that inability should not be used to thwart the 
payment bond statute from achieving the stated purpose of these 
statutes. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT HERCULES INTEREST IS 
NOT ALIENABLE AND, EVEN IF SUCH INTEREST WERE NOT ALIENABLE, 
PLAINTIFF'S MECHANIC'S LIEN IS NOT DEFEATED AS A RESULT. 
With regard to the dismissal of .Plaintifffs mechanic's lien 
cause of action on summary judgment, the trial court erred in two 
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respects in ruling that Plaintiff's mechanic's lien could not 
attach to the interest of Hercules in and to the subject property. 
First, there is nothing in the Facilities Use Agreement between 
Hercules and the United States Government which is an absolute bar 
to the alienability of Hercules interest in the property. In 
fact, the Facilities Use Agreement contemplates the possibility of 
such liens. Second, there is nothing in the mechanic's lien 
statute which requires that an interest in real property must be 
alienable in order for a mechanic's lien to attach. The 
mechanic's lien statute simply states "This lien shall attach only 
to such interest as the owner may have in the property." Utah 
Code Annotated § 38-1-3 (1953 as amended). 
Whether Hercules interest in the subject property is a lease 
is not essential to the attachment of Plaintiff's mechanic's lien 
as Hercules would lead this Court to believe. The clear facts 
presented before the trial court were that Hercules uses the 
subject property for its benefit and gain. While there is no 
doubt that there were certain restrictions placed upon Hercules' 
use of the property, there is also no doubt that to the extent 
allowed under the use agreement Hercules holds a possessory 
interest in the land. Further, the use contract contains no 
specific language against alienation of Hercules' interest. See 
Record at 247. The only evidence that Hercules' interest is not 
alienable is the self-serving parole testimony of Hercules' 
employees. The only competent evidence of as to the alienability 
of Hercules interest is the use agreement. 
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Further, the trial court did not make a specific finding as 
to the exact nature of Hercules interest in the subject property. 
In granting Hercules1 motion for summary judgment on the issue of 
whether Plaintiff's mechanic's lien could attach to Hercules1 
interest, the trial court simply concluded that the interest was 
not alienable and, therefore, Plaintiff's mechanic's lien could 
not attach. The trial court also held that Hercules does hold an 
ownership interest in the subject property which could subject it 
to the provisions of the payment bond statute. 
From the cases discussed in the briefs, it is clear that a 
mechanic's lien can attach to an ownership interest less than fee. 
For example, a leasehold may be attached. Additionally, an option 
interest may be attached. Further, a purchaser's interest may be 
attached, even though the sale has not been fully consummated. If 
non-possessory property interests, such as options and purchaser's 
interests, may be attached by a mechanic's lien, surely Hercules' 
possessory interest may be attached. 
Such a conclusion has previously been specified by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of King Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln 
Company, 21 Utah 2d 43, 440 P.2d 17 (1968). The Court stated: 
This court has allowed a materialman's lien to 
attach to interests less than fee simple, such 
as a leasehold estate, an equitable interest, 
and a building separate and apart from the 
soil upon which it was erected, (citations 
omitted) (emphasis in original) 
King Brothers at 440 P.2d 19. 
It is clear that the nature of the ownership interest is not 
a critical factor in the attachment of a mechanic's lien since the 
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lien attaches "only to such interest as the owner may have in the 
property." It cannot be disputed that Hercules has some interest 
in the property and Plaintiff's valid mechanic's lien should be 
allowed to be foreclosed. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
Utah's mechanic's lien and bond laws are liberally construed 
to protect those who provide labor, materials and equipment for 
projects such as the office complexes built for Defendant-Appellee 
Hercules. Hercules holds an interest in the subject property 
which is sufficient for Plaintiff's mechanic's lien to attach. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
decision of the trial court at summary judgment by reinstating 
Plaintiff's mechanic's lien cause of action against the subject 
property and remand for further proceedings in the foreclosure of 
that mechanic's lien. 
Further, based upon the policy underlying the mechanic's lien 
and payment bond statutes, and based upon the facts and 
circumstances presented at the motions for summary judgement and 
at the trial of the case, the office complexes became part of the 
subject real property. This is the only legal conclusion which 
can be properly drawn from the facts presented. Therefore, 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
decision of the trial court following the trial of the case by 
ordering that the trial court enter judgment for Plaintiff on its 
failure to obtain a bond cause of action and remand the case for a 
determination as to the amount of the judgment. 
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DATED this 15th day of August, 1989. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK, P.C. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff's Reply Brief addresses primarily three issues. 
First, Hercules erroneously states that the parties are in 
agreement as to the law which should apply to the case. Hercules 
would have this Court apply the personal property/fixture test 
set forth in Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n., 657 
P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982). The Mueller test is inappropriate for the 
present case since it involves buildings and structures of signi-
ficant magnitude rather than handrails, catwalks, dairy equip-
ment, or other such personal property as was involved in the 
Mueller case and other Utah payment bond cases. 
When an Hercules, an owner of an interest in the subject 
real property, contracted with Modulaire to have buildings or 
structures placed upon that property, that is all that was 
required to obligate Hercules to obtain a payment bond pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 (1953 as amended prior to 1987). 
All that is required by § 14-2-1 is that an "owner of any 
interest in land" enter into a contract involving $2,000 or more 
for the "construction, addition to, alteration or repair" of any 
"building" or "structure" or "improvement." Clearly, the office 
complexes involved in this case are buildings and/or structures 
and are not subject to the personal property/fixture test stated 
in Mueller. 
The second issue addressed in this Reply Brief is Hercules 
attempts to misuse the theory of in pari materia to defeat 
Plaintiff's claim. The theory of in pari materia is applied to 
situations dealing with statutes which relate to the same person 
or thing or have a common purpose. While in many circumstances, 
S-l 
the mechanic's lien and payment bond statutes can and should be 
read in pari materia,, where such a reading would defeat the clear 
purpose of these statutes, such a reading is inappropriate. The 
clear purpose of the mechanic's lien and payment bond statutes is 
to assure that laborers and materialmen get paid. Where 
procedural or other problems frustrate that purpose for either 
the mechanic's lien statute or payment bond statute, such 
procedural or other problems should not be used to prevent the 
other statute from accomplishing the stated purpose. This Court 
should carry out the clear intent of these statutes. 
The third issue addressed in this Reply Brief concerns the 
trial court's determination that the alienability of Hercules' 
interest in the subject property affects whether Plaintiff's 
mechanic's lien attaches to such interest. The alienability of 
Hercules' interest in the subject property is not relevant to a 
determination of whether Plaintiff's mechanic's lien can attach 
to such interest. While it may affect the marketability of the 
property at the foreclosure sale, it does not affect whether the 
lien can attach to Hercules' interest. To rule otherwise is to 
encourage lessees and others who hold less than fees simple title 
to structure their dealings to avoid the clear intent and lang-
uage of the mechanic's lien statute which states that the lien 
" attach [es] only to such interest as the owner may have in the 
property." Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-3 (1953 as amended). This 
Court should reverse the trial court's determination that the 
Plaintiff's lien cannot attach to Hercules' interest in the 
subject property. 
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